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—  About one in three Belgian multinational companies lacking a European Works Council 
is currently engaged in establishing one or have developed ‘functionally equivalent’ 
structures. 
—  The remaining companies are confronted with serious obstacles to establishing a 
European Works Council, principally: (i) a lack of knowledge about them, (ii) weak and 
time-consuming national-level information and consultation processes, and (iii) a low 
perceived added value of transnational information and consultation.
—  The local level of employee representation needs to be strengthened to increase the 
number of EWCs, and trade unions need to inform employee representatives more 
about the importance of the European level. 
–
 Key points
In March 2018, the 32,000 employees of the largest cheese 
production company in the world, Lactalis, finally received a green 
light on establishing a European Works Council (EWC) in their 
company. Up to that point their requests had been continuously 
ignored by the management. However, an impeding court case 
made the management compromise and now, at least, a special 
negotiating body has been composed which should lead to a 
fully-fledged EWC in two years at most (EWC Academy 2018). 
Obviously, setting up an EWC is not always an easy process. As 
shown by the stories of EWCs established in such companies as 
Unilever, it takes time, energy and perseverance to get one up 
and running (Eurofound 2015; Girndt 1999; Kotthoff and Whittall 
2014; Whittall et al. 2007). In a situation where management is 
unwilling to cooperate, it may even take a court case.
The creation of more EWCs was, however, one of the main aims of 
the Recast of the EU Directive on European Works Councils (see 
Recital 7). For some time now, there has been a declining trend 
in the number of created EWCs and, unfortunately, the Recast 
Directive hasn’t been able to reverse this trend. Furthermore, there 
are still many companies estimated to not have an EWC despite 
employing a sufficient number of employees. According to the 
latest estimations, still less than half of all eligible companies have 
an EWC (De Spiegelaere 2016). In another study, it was found 
that one in three companies that were involved in transnational 
restructuring did not have a EWC or a European Company/ 
Societas Europaea Works Council (SEWC) (De Spiegelaere 2017a). 
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These facts lead to two important questions: why are there not 
more EWCs and what is keeping those companies who meet the 
criteria from establishing one?
Literature
Some years ago, a detailed study by Whittall et al. (2015) 
considered these questions by looking at the situation in German 
companies. It found that there are several necessary preconditions 
for an EWC to be established. First of all, the actors involved 
(management, employee representatives and union officers) need 
to be aware of the existence of European Works Councils. If there 
is a lack of basic knowledge about EWCs and their functioning, 
it will be difficult to get the ball rolling to create one. 
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Second, the employee representatives and union officers need 
to have information about the company size. They need to know 
whether or not their company is eligible for establishing an 
EWC. In the Whittall (2015) study, it appeared that quite a few 
employee representatives from companies that could have had 
an EWC were not aware of that fact. They thought their company 
was simply not large enough. 
However, even if these preconditions are met, EWCs are not 
necessarily always established. Even with enough awareness 
and information, employee representatives will weigh the added 
value of an EWC against the means required to establish one and 
the existence of other priorities. In some companies the added 
value of an EWC is limited. Imagine a company where there’s 
almost no transnational governance and all important decisions 
are taken by the local management. In this case there will be 
few transnational issues and therefore little need for an EWC. 
What is more, setting up an EWC sometimes requires a great deal 
of resources. The employee representatives need to get in touch 
with their colleagues abroad, align their positions, send a request, 
collect information about EWCs, negotiate, meet, discuss, etc. 
All this takes time and money. Time which the representatives 
could otherwise invest in their local trade union or works council 
duties. Where relations with the local or national management 
are tense, setting up an EWC is often not a priority. Similarly, if 
contact with national or European trade unions is missing and/
or if no one among the workers’ representatives speaks a foreign 
language, chances are low that the initiative will be taken.
One of the interesting and challenging conclusions of the study 
of Whittall et al. (2015) was that some employee representatives 
saw little added value in an EWC because they had good and close 
relations with the top management. In other words, they didn’t 
feel that they needed to defend their interests at the transnational 
level. Moreover, they feared that an EWC could affect their special 
relationship with the central management. Many also doubted 
the added value an EWC would offer not because there are no 
transnational issues, but because an EWC is, according to them, 
not strong enough to really make a difference: it demands lots 
of investment for very little return. 
Focus on Belgium
In this study we apply the same framework to another population: 
Belgian companies that do not have an EWC. We consider the 
Belgian case to be an interesting one as it is a country with a 
highly internationalised economy and the presence of many 
multinational companies (MNCs). There is, in other words, great 
potential for EWCs to flourish. Belgian employee representatives 
also seem to be well equipped for establishing EWCs. They are 
used to working in multi-lingual environments, have strong 
unions which support EWCs, and a large presence of local 
works councils. At the same time, Belgium is a small country, 
making them fairly dependent on transnational strategy. We 
therefore suspect that most Belgian employee representatives 
will see the importance of the transnational level because they 
cannot sufficiently defend their interests at the national level 
in MNCs. All in all, we argue that Belgium is a primary example 
of a country where EWCs should be widespread. Taking a closer 
look at those Belgian companies that do not have EWCs could 
thus teach us something about ‘hard-to-access’ (for EWCs) 
companies more generally. 
In short, the central research question is: how can we explain 
the fact that some companies headquartered in Belgium do not 
have EWCs when all the right preconditions are in place?
Method
To study this question, the following research design was 
implemented. To start with, the Capital IQ dataset was used to 
find all listed companies headquartered in Belgium and (along with 
other sources) to establish whether those companies had enough 
employees in a sufficient number of countries to fall under the scope 
of the EWC Directive. Next, we looked at the EWCdb.eu database 
to see whether or not these companies already had an established 
EWC. The EWCdb.eu is the most exhaustive database collecting 
information about EWCs and EWC agreements (De Spiegelaere 
2017b); it is likely to contain errors, but we double-checked the 
information during the subsequent interviews. From this exercise, 
the researchers selected 13 companies which employed over 1,000 
employees and at least 150 in two different European Economic 
Area (EEA) countries, and that did not have an EWC. 
This methodology only gives us information about the listed 
companies in Belgium. Next to these 13, we are confident there 
are many Belgian non-listed companies that do not have an EWC. 
We are also aware that the Capital IQ database might include 
some errors. The aim of this study was, however, not to compile 
a complete list of Belgian companies without EWCs but a sample. 
Several local trade unionists and union officers from the two 
largest Belgian trade unions (the Confederation of Christian 
Trade Unions, ACV/CSC, and the General Labour Federation of 
Belgium, ABVV/FGTB) were approached for telephone interviews. 
In total, this study is based on 16 interviews with representatives 
and officers from 12 of the 13 identified companies. 
The companies are multinationals active in various EU countries. 
Their sectors range from distribution (1), chemical industry (3), 
construction (2), finance (1), telecoms (1), high-tech (2) and 
food and services (2). 
The semi-structured telephone interviews were based on a series 
of questions inspired by the research of Whittall et al. (2015). 
Interviews began by collecting demographic information about 
the person and the company, which led to an assessment of 
the person’s knowledge regarding EWCs, the coverage of the 
Recast Directive, the possible added value of an EWC, the related 
costs, and possible other priorities. The semi-structured nature 
of the interview left open the possibility for the interviewees to 
provide their own stories and explanations. The interviews were 
transcribed, and a thematic analysis was performed based on the 
framework of Whittall et al. (2015), using the NVIVO software 
(Olijslagers 2018). 
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Findings
From this analysis, three broad clusters of Belgian MNCs without 
EWCs emerged: those who are in the process of establishing an 
EWC, those who have alternative structures, and those who lack 
knowledge, information and motivation. 
EWC loading…
The first group contains two companies that were in the process 
of establishing an EWC. Obviously, the interviewees in these 
companies knew about the workings of EWCs and their potential. 
For the most part, they considered the added value an of an 
EWC to be in obtaining legitimate transnational information, 
as they couldn’t always do so via the national-level institutions 
of information and consultation. One of the interviewees also 
referred to the uniting potential of an EWC for the workforces 
of different countries. At the same time, in both cases it was 
observed that the national level took priority over the European 
level which indicated a lack of willingness and enthusiasm of 
other representatives to invest much in establishing the EWC. 
To summarise, in this cluster, information and knowledge were 
not the issue. The added value of an EWC was recognised but 
the finite resources and the continuing priority of the national 
level limited the representatives’ engagement at the European 
level. In the study of Whittall et al. (2015), no mention is made 
of companies in the process of establishing an EWC. Nevertheless, 
the results show that the representatives in these companies were 
aware of the EWC framework, informed about the company size 
requirements, and convinced the EWC can be of value. However, 
national-level representation work took up most resources and 
not all representatives were equally convinced. 
There is an alternative
The second group consists of two companies that had developed 
what could be described as a ‘functional equivalent’ of an EWC 
and therefore saw little value in establishing one. Both companies 
were active in the construction industry. According to the 
representatives of one, they had about one or two meetings a 
year where they met with representatives from the other countries 
to discuss general issues such as the latest developments in the 
sector and the company. As well as these employee-only meetings, 
they also met with the management. A similar arrangement was 
in place in the other company. Here, the employee representatives 
had the authority to call a meeting with representatives of other 
companies, which was then facilitated by the management. 
The representatives in these companies had quite an extensive 
knowledge of EWC rules and had already informed themselves 
about whether or not the company was covered by the Directive. If 
the current ‘functional equivalent’ were to become ineffective, the 
representatives knew they could threaten to take steps towards 
establishing an EWC. At the same time, the benefits of actually 
doing so were considered to be low, as the existing structures 
were regarded as equally effective.
This group is a surprising one. Before the EWC regulation was 
established, companies did create ‘EWC-like’ voluntary structures, 
which then got formalised as Article 13 EWCs. However, the two 
structures in these cases were created after the EWC Directive 
came into effect. In the literature on EWCs, there is little known 
about such ‘functional equivalents’. However, they do show that 
when the need for transnational dialogue is present, companies 
and representatives still create structures that fit those needs. 
EWCs? Sorry, we’re busy for the moment
The third group is the largest (9 of the 13 companies, or 70%) 
and consists of all companies that did not have an EWC, were 
not busy establishing one or did not have functional equivalents. 
The question is therefore: why not?
Focusing first on the overall knowledge about the EWC 
regulation and rules, we observed that for most of the employee 
representatives it was very limited, meaning that they knew of the 
existence of EWCs but not much more beyond that. Interestingly 
(but not surprisingly), these companies had relatively defunct local 
representation structures which took a lot of time to coordinate. 
Those who had some knowledge about EWCs all said they were 
informed by their trade unions in training courses or through 
flyers and publications, confirming the important role trade 
unions have in setting up EWCs. 
Turning to the question of knowledge about the size and 
structure of the company, a more nuanced picture emerges. 
Most representatives could give a rough estimation of the number 
of employees working for the company in Belgium and abroad. 
They therefore also had a general idea of whether or not the 
company met the EWC thresholds. The information mostly came 
from the ‘Economic and Financial Information’ which the works 
council is obliged to receive annually in Belgium. In only one 
company was a serious knowledge deficiency observed, with the 
union officer having little or no clue about how many employees 
were working for the company abroad. In one other case, the 
employee representative asked the management once about the 
possibility of establishing an EWC but didn’t get a serious reply. 
One of the main issues in this group, however, was the combination 
of more urgent national priorities and a low perceived added 
value of having an EWC. Almost all the companies lacking an 
EWC had a rather weak unionisation rate amongst the workforce 
and dysfunctional local works councils. The national level was 
therefore given full attention and no energy remained to develop 
a transnational form of information and consultation. 
In one case, the value of an EWC was identified by the Belgian 
representatives in the aftermath of a large transnational 
restructuring in the company. However, as they only received 
bits and pieces of information, preventing them from having 
an overview of the situation, and lacked contacts in the other 
countries, they were not able to act in a unified way. 
In another case, the representatives saw an EWC as a threat, with 
one explaining that he was scared it would lead to a ‘harmonisation’ 
of wages in the company, meaning that the Belgians would see 
their salaries decrease. The fear of management exploiting the 
situation is thus also a significant factor (Greer and Hauptmeier 
2016). 
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Interestingly, financial resources were never identified as a 
problem. When asked, all respondents stated that the trade 
union would cover costs related to the preparatory meetings 
for filing an official request to set up a special negotiating body. 
Taking these findings as a whole, it is interesting to see that the 
priority of the national level and the perceived lack of added 
value of an EWC was never connected (by the interviewees) to a 
lack of transnational management by the company. Not one of 
the interviewees said that an EWC would not be useful because 
there were no transnational issues. References were only made to 
a lack of resources, perceived risks of transnational information 
and consultation processes, and national-level information and 
consultation taking up all the reps’ energy. 
We conclude from this third group that these companies faced 
various obstacles to the establishment of an EWC, with the most 
important being: (1) a lack of knowledge regarding the rules, 
limits and potential of an EWC, (2) a low perceived added value 
and (3) representation work at the national level being the priority 
and therefore using up resources. A lack of information about 
the company size played only a minor role.
The findings from this third group largely confirm the findings of 
Whittall et al. (2015) but differ in two important aspects. First, 
while the German study observed a serious lack of information 
about the company size amongst representatives, this was not 
the case for the Belgian sample. This could be explained by two 
factors: (i) this might just be a sampling issue as this study did not 
include family-run businesses which may be less transparent; (ii) 
the Belgian system of yearly ‘economic and financial information’ 
gives employees a direct insight into the company structure and 
this might explain why all were well informed.
Second, while the German study concluded that there was a low 
perceived added value of EWCs, this was not really confirmed in 
our Belgian study. Only in one company was the EWC seen as a 
potential threat. The reason for this difference is a subject for 
further research. However, one possible explanation is simply 
the size of the country (and thus the extent of economic 
internationalisation). Given the small size of Belgium, a Belgian 
multinational might be more likely to have real transnational 
management than a German multinational, where the relative 
importance of the home country is likely to be larger. Linked to 
this, the fear of losing a special relation with the management 
was an important variable in Germany but couldn’t be found 
in Belgium. 
What does this mean? Think global, act 
local!
In this policy brief, we have questioned why, in a country where 
employee representatives have many objectively good reasons 
for establishing an EWC (such as a small open economy) and 
should have sufficient resources to do so (strong unions and 
local works councils), there are still companies who don’t have 
an up-and-running EWC. The findings show that there are three 
large groups of companies with their own individual explanations. 
The first is the group of companies who are in the process of 
establishing an EWC. In the second group, the companies have 
developed ‘functional equivalents’ of EWCs, with EU legislation 
serving as a back-up plan for when the current solutions cease 
to be effective. The third (and unfortunately largest) group is 
composed of all the other cases. In line with previous research, 
the identified obstacles in this group are a lack of knowledge, a 
low perceived added value of having an EWC, and time-intensive 
local employee representation structures. 
If the European Union wants to develop a policy to boost the 
creation of EWCs, it therefore needs to think about strengthening 
local trade unions, works councils and other structures of 
employee representation. This could increase resources at the 
local level, which are essential for European transnational social 
dialogue. 
Second, the added value of an EWC needs to be promoted. 
Strengthening workers’ and representatives’ rights to timely 
and detailed information, increasing involvement in restructuring 
processes, and making these rights enforceable are all important 
steps in this direction. Trade unions can also help by doing 
more to inform employee representatives about the value of 
European-level information and consultation. If many employee 
representatives don’t know about EWCs or have the wrong idea 
about what they can contribute, they will be unlikely to invest 
in establishing one. 
Next, information regarding the establishment procedures needs 
to be disseminated more widely. In this study (and previous 
ones) the trade union role was found to be essential in this. 
Strengthening the role of trade unions in EWCs would therefore 
be advisable.
Lastly, other known barriers to EWC creation, not treated in 
this study, also need to be attended to, two key examples being 
better enforcement in companies that do not cooperate and the 
establishment of a transnational company database listing all 
eligible companies. 
References
De Spiegelaere S. (2017a) Company restructuring across borders: 
with or without European works councils? Policy Brief 7, Brussels, 
ETUI.
De Spiegelaere S. (2017b) The EWC database data quality guide, 
Brussels, ETUI.
De Spiegelaere S. (2016) Too little, too late? Evaluating the 
European works councils Recast Directive, Report 138, Brussels, 
ETUI.
Eurofound (2015) European works council developments before, 
during and after the crisis, Luxembourg, Publications Office of 
the European Union. 
EWC Academy (2018) EWC-news.
5
ETUI Policy Brief European Economic, Employment and Social Policy – N° 7/2019
Girndt C. (1999) The long march towards a European Works 
Council. Mitbestimmung, 26-28. https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/
magmb_1999_girndt.pdf.
Greer I. and Hauptmeier M. (2016) Management whipsawing: 
the staging of labor competition under globalization, ILR Review, 
69 (1), 29-52. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915602254.
Kotthoff H. and Whittall M. (2014) Paths to transnational 
solidarity: identity-building processes in European works councils, 
Oxford, Peter Lang.
Olijslagers C. (2018) Van Nationaal naar Transnationaal. Een 
kwalitatief onderzoek naar de factoren die de oprichting van een 
EOR verhinderen bij Belgische werknemersvertegenwoordigers 
(MA thesis), Leuven, KU Leuven. 
Whittall M., Knudsen H. and Huijgen F. (eds.) (2007) Towards 
a European labour identity: the case of the European works 
council, London, Routledge.
Whittall M., Lücking S., Trinczek R. and Gunkel J. (2015) Closed 
frontiers. Why German multinationals don’t utilise the European 
works council Directive, Düsseldorf, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.
ETUI publications are published to elicit comment and to encourage debate. The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the ETUI nor those of the members of its general assembly.
The ETUI Policy Brief series is edited jointly by Jan Drahokoupil, Philippe Pochet, Aída Ponce Del Castillo, Kurt Vandaele and Sigurt Vitols.
The editor responsible for this issue is Jan Drahokoupil, jdrahokoupil@etui.org
This electronic publication, as well as previous issues of the ETUI Policy Briefs, is available at www.etui.org/publications. You may find further information  
on the ETUI at www.etui.org.
© ETUI aisbl, Brussels, October 2019
All rights reserved. ISSN 2031-8782
The ETUI is financially supported by the European Union.  
The European Union is not responsible for any use made of the information contained in this publication. 
